Missing links in the Cha-cha debate
Posted by: Alecks P. Pabico | December 11, 2006 at 11:36 pm
Filed under: Charter Change
DID you know that a parliamentary system does not necessarily mean having a unicameral legislature, as House Speaker Jose de Venecia and his league of Con-Ass congressmen are so eager to have the country embrace?
This is one common misconception about parliamentary systems, according to a paper of the Senate Economic Planning Office which was published on the Senate website at about the time the Supreme Court was deliberating on the constitutionality of the so-called administration-backed “people’s initiative.”
The paper points out that there are parliamentary systems which have bicameral legislatures, citing Canada, Australia, India, Malaysia and Japan as examples. The parliamentary system’s model and prototype, the United Kingdom with its Westminster model, is, in fact, bicameral — the U.K. parliament being composed of the House of Lords and the House of Commons.
In parliamentary systems, however, the Lower House is usually more powerful than the Upper House. The SEPO paper enumerates two reasons for this: “In parliamentary bicameral systems, it is the lower house that is the focal point of politics and governance as it is where the executive is drawn. Another reason is to prevent the cabinet from being subjected to ‘contradictory pressures, unable to command the confidence of one or other chamber’.”
And for charter change advocates like Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and de Venecia who wish to combine parliamentary and federal systems with a unicameral legislature, here’s another interesting piece of information: All the countries of the world with federal systems have bicameral legislatures.
A second chamber or the Upper House, the paper says, is especially important in federal states because they tend to balance tensions that may arise between national and local governments as a result of their shared sovereignty.
Though it does come out in defense of the Senate amid calls from the Lower House and Malacañang for its abolition, the SEPO paper is still worth reading through as it includes an introduction to the nature and basic features of a parliamentary system, its types, advantages and disadvantages. It also gives readers a brief narrative of the Philippine experience in constitutional design from the time of the drafting of the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution crafted under a revolutionary government.
Calling the current initiative the third wave of charter-change efforts in the post-Edsa era, the paper notes that for the first time in the country’s history, a constitution is being proposed to be written under what is generally perceived as “normal” times. Moreover, it is the first time that a post-EDSA president has insistently and openly advocated charter change.
The real meat of the paper is its arguments about the missing links in the Charter change debate. Institutional arrangements related to a shift to a parliamentary form of government have received little attention from key advocates, it contends, with the interplay or dynamics of the electoral system, political party and the bureaucracy specifically being left out in the discourse on charter change.
Since in its ideal form, the Legislature is the center of power in parliamentary systems, the paper counsels that the transfer of power from the Executive to the Legislative — an “institutional paradigm shift” for the country — requires institutional arrangements in the said areas of concern to ensure the Parliament’s authority and effectiveness.
Below are excerpts discussing the persistent problems that hound these institutions, which the SEPO paper says should be addressed and given enough space in the debate so as to deepen and generate informed analysis of institutional choices the country can take:
Electoral system
Much of the problems associated with the electoral system can be traced to (its) institutional design (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003). This design, as scholars noted, is still a clone of the pre-Martial law institutions borrowed from the Americans that favored the elite and inhibited the entry of marginalized sectors in politics (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003:278). Proof of this are reports of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) that show that electoral politics in the country is still a millionaires club, dominated by families with links to vital business interests (2004). Little has changed in the political power base which in turn reinforces assessments that indeed the country can be described as a ‘weak state’ that is vulnerable to predatory interests (Hutchcroft 1998; McCoy 1994).
In terms of gender, women still comprise a minority in Philippine politics even if they comprise half of the electorate and the country’s population. More than seven decades since they gained the right to suffrage, only about two of 10 electoral positions are held by women. This is way below the international benchmark of at least 30 percent political participation of women set by the United Nations. It is also worth noting that women are better represented in systems that use proportional representation rather than in plurality/majoritarian types (Dahlerup 2005:26).
(S)ince 1987, Philippine presidents hardly represented a big majority of the electorate. Consequently, this situation weakens the election’s viability as a mechanism for democratic representation.
For one thing, the synchronized elections of national and local politicians have been criticized as being a circus and too complicated for the electorate to make an informed decision on (Rood 2002). The write-in system which is said to be ‘unknown’ in the world (Montinola 1999:135) is also partial to candidates with easy name recall rather than the party. This then favors the incumbent, media personalities and the moneyed in entering the political fray, to the detriment of other sectors who lack machinery.
To add to this, the Comelec’s public image has suffered a beating in recent years. Multilateral institutions blame this on the weak institutional structure of the polling body which hampers its capacity to handle election administration (ADB 2005). Moreover, while consistent high voter-turnout is one of the hallmarks of Philippine democracy, surveys show that Filipinos have expressed decreasing trust in the electoral system. It is also worth noting that perception data in March 1995 and in April 2004 indicate that it is the upper to middle classes that have registered the highest decline in satisfaction compared to other sectors of society.
Though there are a menu of available options, the paper says designing an electoral system should also consider the country’s political culture and the socio-economic context of politics. Issues and problems that characterize the Philippine electoral system should be the basis of any move to redesign the electoral system.
Political parties
Patronage-ridden and personality-oriented parties characterize the country’s politics (Lande 1965). Thus, they are unable to aggregate demands of the electorate and fail to serve as a mechanism to educate the public on vital development issues. This then leads to a political system dominated by the elite. Scholars blame this on the institutional design transported by the Americans at the turn of the 19th century (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003) that privileges the landed and educated. Consequently, political parties have often been used by the elite to further their interests and build big one-party coalitions even after the Marcos leadership (Ibid.).
While a system of party-list representation was introduced in 1995, administrative constraints, inadequate information and loopholes in the law such as the threshold and the three-seat limit (Tangkia and Habaradas, 2001) render it unable to bring more access to the politically weak sectors of society (Wurfel 1997; Teehankee 2001; Reilly 2003). More than a decade since the enactment of the party-list law little has changed in the structure of elite dominance in the legislative branch.Moreover, the 1987 Constitution seems to have failed to make a connection between the electoral system and the party system. The latter defines the interrelationship between and among parties. As discussed above, the open party system mandated by the Constitution does not exactly fit a majoritarian type of an electoral system as it results in minority presidents. Scholars usually associate it with presidential systems that have relatively stable two-party systems such as that of the United States. Therefore, the combination of an open or multi-party system with a majoritarian electoral system in the Philippines, results in many parties competing for the presidency. Because party ideologies are not present, the common postelection scenario shows parties consolidating into coalitions with the winning presidential candidate. In terms of governance, these shifting coalitions yield an unstable political climate, vulnerable to breakdowns and crises.
Bureaucracy
The absence of a fixed term of office and the perennial threat of government shake-up make a professional, competent and effective bureaucracy crucial in a parliamentary system. It not only provides continuity and stability in times of crises but also makes the delivery of vital services possible in periods of conflict. Despite its crucial role, it is surprising that it is not part of the discussions on the move to amend the charter. The role of the bureaucracy in a parliamentary system is especially significant in the light of parallel attempts to also change the economic provisions of the 1987 Constitution to make it more attuned to liberalization. Any state that seeks to further liberalize its economy needs the proper regulatory framework so that it can manage the risks and volatilities that increased competition brings. However, a proper role of the bureaucracy in a parliamentary set-up must consider its endemic and structural problems such as the spoils system, overlapping agencies and the huge number of political appointments (ADB 2005).
For instance, the nature of political appointments is worthy of examination. The Civil Service Commission estimates that the President of the Philippines appoints 11,0007 officials in the bureaucracy as a result of the constitutional provision allowing the president to appoint heads of agencies, naval captains, and other personnel provided by law. As such, this must be given attention by those advocating charter change precisely because the future Prime Minister cannot appoint this many officials. Frequent leadership change will render the civil service inoperative if these officials need to be changed every time there is a vote of no confidence.
Because the criticism often hurled against a parliamentary system is the tendency of the executive to consolidate power, the nature of legislative oversight of the bureaucracy should also be an important issue. Some tools that can be explored are the creation of Public Account Committees (PAC) and the institution of a set of ‘parliamentary auditors’ such as the one in Sweden, exclusively for oversight (NDI 2000). However, this must be complemented by greater public and media access to information to enhance external oversight mechanisms and also intra-chamber discipline. After all, ‘guarding the guardians’ is also an important element of democratic accountability.
Lastly, there is also a need to professionalize and institutionalize the bureaucracy of the Parliament. A career system similar to the one instituted in the Executive Branch should be matched by the legislature. Legislators’ capacity to perform oversight is related to the capability and competence of its permanent staff. This is especially important in a parliamentary system where theoretically the power is lodged in the parliament more than the executive.
In conclusion, the paper argues that a redesign of the country’s political system should include finding an electoral system and instituting genuine political parties and a professional bureaucracy that seek to address the country’s age-old problems.
Shifting to a parliamentary system, it says, is not as simple as it is presented to the public, which at this point seems to be confined to the means of revising the Constitution. “It is an intricate weave of institutional design based on a consensus of goals of the different stakeholders. Without an understanding of these, the purported benefits of a parliamentary system stand on shaky ground.”
Download the CEPO paper.
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Contrary and unknown to most, majority of Parliamentary system form of Government based on British Model is Bicameral. Canada is a Bicameral Parliamentary System with the Upper House (the House of Senate) and the Lower House (the House of Commons). The are both legislative in function, but the executive function reside on the PM and his/her Cabinet which are members of the house of Commons. Although legislation must be approved by both houses, it is very rare that the house of Senate reject the legislation passed by the Lower House whose members are Democratically Elected, while the Senators are Appointed by the Governor General at the advice of the Prime Minister. Except for Money Bill, any Legislation can be introduced in either houses.
Senators tenure used to be from time of appointment to Life, but now is limited to the age of 75 years. Can only be removed for specified reasons…
The original idea of having the Upper House was a sobering check for a Lower House, whose dominant party ruling the government of day might turn tyrannical or authoritarian. Otherwise it is mostly perfunctory and ceremonial, although in hierarchy takes precedence over the members of the House of Common (as the name implies, common).
[...] The PCIJ, meanwhile, points out the “missing link” in the Cha-cha debate. Manolo Quezon ruminates on public opinion vis-a-vis Cha-cha: “The only consensus I can see is in terms of public opinion: and public opinion is more defined in terms of what the public does not want, than what it actually wants. What does the public not want?” [...]
Naykika the problem with Philippines politics lies not in the form of the government, the problem lies with the character, tuso pilosopo, mapagkunyari.
Kaya nga ang mga OFW nataguriang masigasig at masipag, walang reklamo kahit pa overwork, kasi foreigner yung amo. But look at the local maids and janitors, diba they are normally tamad and abuse? Kasi Filipino ang amo. Ganun lang yun kasimple.
Politically applied, we can only be good if our government is headed by a foreigner, ano sa palagay mo?
mac.bh,
I agree with you, that our problem over there is not the form of Govt., but the people in government, but so are the people in general, who for so long has tolerated the status guo to go on. And nothing in the Charter can do much about it. A charter is as good as the authorities who enforce its provisions. It’s been noted by so many political scientists, experts, and even foreign governments that the current form of Government and our Charter is one of the best among Democracies. How we screwed it up is beyond me and the rest of us.
As our attitude, there is a ring of truth to it, but attitudes and characters can change in a matter of time, if people can see that such change is for the everyone benefits, including the ones with “attitudes”. It is just inherent in human. Be Pilipinos or any nationalities or race..thanks.
Tails Between Their Legs…
Proponents of a measure to amend the Philippines’ constitution via a constituent assembly - or Con-Ass for short - beat a hasty retreat yesterday when representatives led by speaker Jose de Venecia emerged from a caucus and admitted defeat - sort…