BOTH SIDES, however, failed to take into account four factors: the Roman Catholic Church as a whole; citizens’ groups pledged to guard the voting and the counting; an antagonized media; and, it seems, an antagonized armed forces, or at least its rank and file.

While the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy remained timid and indecisive about the level of political confrontation it would assume, preparations had begun for what would have been the last-ditch fight of the Constitutional Change experiment: a national plebiscite. Therefore, if bishops couldn’t agree on much, they could agree on the need for vigilance. The Catholic Church had experienced a growing gulf between the impatience and at times, more radical instincts of the clergy and religious, and the temporizing and pliability of the prelates. The priests and religious were always the main force making up citizens’ electoral watchdogs like the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV); it would step forward to play a significant role in the voting and the counting.

The National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel), too, under new leadership, was eager to restore a reputation severely tarnished by the 2004 polls. Other groups, such as the lawyers’ organization Lente, were organized, willing, and ultimately able to confront the Comelec and other officials during the counting.

Turnout became another factor affecting the results. Since many local contests weren’t exciting, that may account for the lower-than-usual turnout. An election where everyone knows the results leads to a depressed turnout: the 1935 and 1953 presidential elections, with a widely-assumed landslide result even prior to the polls, are good examples.

The media as well proved to be particularly difficult to cow during the polls. Resources were marshaled and deployed to conduct quick counts with the help of computer schools and student volunteers. The Comelec eventually ordered them stopped. But even then traditional playground of political operators — the provinces of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), whose remoteness often served as a means to keep the areas free of media scrutiny — were covered thoroughly this time around.

The armed forces, said to have pledged to deliver a 12-0 victory for the administration senatorial slate, voted for its own.

It also has to be said that the sudden illness of the president’s husband, a key player and preeminent broker of Kampi, had an effect on the conduct of the campaign. Indeed, other candidates have echoed boxing champion and congressional candidate Manny Pacquiao’s complaint that funding dried up during the campaign.

And there was the weight of history — of precedent. Whether anyone likes it or not, or acknowledges it or not, both House and Senate elections have been going on long enough to represent their own set of political dynamics, often incredibly resilient over time.

THE 2007 elections represent only the third time in a century that the elections for the Lower House coincided with a president’s midterm. The other times were in 1938 –incidentally the only time in Philippine history that a ruling party or coalition achieved total control of the Lower House — and in 1995. (See Table 1)

Table 1. Elections for the House of Representatives, 1907-2007 Includes Philippine Assembly (1907-1916), House of Representatives (1916-1935), National Assembly (1935-1941), House of Representatives (1941, 1946-1973), Batasang Pambansa (1978-1986), House of Representatives (1987-present) Presidential election years are in bold * Years House was retained by party that lost presidency Midterm elections are underlined Unicameral elections are italicized (Note that exact number of party affiliations for 1987-onward cannot be guaranteed, because of changing affiliations over time.)
YEAR	ADMINISTRATION	OPPOSITION
1907 (Philippine Assembly: upper house appointed)	59 NP	16 PP 5 Independents
1909	62 NP	17 PP 2 Independents
1912	62 NP	16 PP
1916 (House of Representatives)	75 NP	7 PP 2 Terc. 6 Independents
1922	33 Col. + 22 NP	25 Dem.
1934	70 Anti	19 Pro
1935 (National Assembly)	Coalition: 64 Anti, 19 Pro	6 Independents
1938	98 NP (100%)	0
1941 (House of Representatives)	95 NP	3 Independents
1946	68 LP (all ex-NP)	24 NP 6 Democratic Alliance (unseated with 1 NP representative)
1953* (NP admin elected)	59 LP	31 NP
1957	77 NP	25 LP
1961* (LP admin elected)	74 NP	29 LP
1965* (NP admin elected)	61 LP	38 NP 5 others
1969	88 NP	18 LP
1978 (Interim Batasang Pambansa)	151 KBL	13 Pusyon Bisaya 1 Mindanao Alliance
1984 (Regular Batasang Pambansa)	123 KBL	60 Unido/PDP-Laban
1987 (House of Representatives)	149 Admin coalition: 53 LNB 37 PDP-Laban 26 Unido 19 LP 9 Reg’l 5 Independents	49 Opposition coalition: 17 Independents 12 NP 10 KBL 5 Reg’l 3 GAD
1992	136 Admin coalition: 86 LDP 40 Lakas 11 LP-PDP	30 NPC 3 KBL
1995	126 Lakas 28 LDP 6 LP 3 PDP 2 NP	28 NPC 2 KBL 9 others
1998* (LAMMP admin elected)	111 Lakas elected; became: 135 LAMMP, 13 LP	55 LAMMP elected; became: 37 Lakas, 35 others
2001	People Power Coalition: 82 Lakas 53 NPC 21 LDP 21 LP	19 others 10 Independents
2004	K4 Coalition: (As of election: 93 Lakas, 53 NPC, 11 LDP, 29 LP) (after realignment: 79 Lakas, 40 NPC, 34 LP, 26 Kampi, 7 LDP, 5 NP)	(As of election: 19 others, 5 Independents) 20 others: 4 KNP, 2 PMP, 1 KBL, etc.
2007 (projected)	90 Lakas 47 Kampi 18 LP 17 NPC	5 Independents 5 NP 4 LDP 3 PDP-Laban 2 UNO

House elections have never been considered as being decided by the popularity of the incumbent president. The reason is simple: From 1907 to 1935, there were no presidential elections; after that, the 1935 Constitution was amended in 1941, to extend Lower House terms from three to four years, making representatives subject to the same terms as presidents. Lower House elections then became part and parcel of the bigger contest for control of Malacañang. Each Lower House election was therefore timed to take place during a presidential poll, which has its own set of dynamics.

What did emerge, from 1941 to 1969 and beyond, to the Batasang Pambansa and to the present, is that House elections have always resulted in an overwhelming administration victory. Without any exceptions. Even if the president running for reelection lost, his party would still win the House; and in cases where presidents were elected from the opposition, they would swiftly ensure that by the next poll, their minority would be an overwhelming House majority. In a sense, the House is so adaptable, so pliable, so dependent on the presidency’s patronage powers that it ends up supporting whoever occupies the Palace — until, that is, the presidency passes on to someone else.

And so not only did the opposition almost totally concede the House and local races — no real precedent existed to declare the House and local polls as material to the contest that tradition, experience, and the actual setup of the government dictated as the one to watch: that of the Senate.