6 JUNE 2007
SEE ALSO
RECENT FEATURES
PUBLIC EYE NEW POLITICAL DYNASTIES
2006 FEATURES
ADDICTIONS
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AND SO the shocker of election day (and in the days of counting that followed) was the revelation that so-called Palace bailiwicks were non-existent. By June 4, a GMANews.tv report was citing a Malacañang statement that said TU bets had “emerged unopposed in 34 towns, including 17 towns in Maguindanao, and 17 others in the Visayan provinces of Cebu, Bohol, Northern Samar and Eastern Samar and in the Mindanao provinces of Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, Sulu, and Zamboanga Sibugay.” This is a far cry from the administration’s relentless optimism prior to, and in the wake of, the polls. Entire regions had been expected to deliver votes to the administration. Then it became entire provinces, and finally, as of the most recent reckoning, it’s a mere 34 towns. The scale of the administration rout, in national terms, can be gleaned from the diminished claims of where the administration obtained its vaunted 12-0 Senate votes. Just as the machinery had collapsed spectacularly for President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, for Ramon Mitra Jr. in 1992, and Jose de Venecia in 1998, it also did so now. It’s possible that the administration, fixated on governors and congressmen over the past years, forgot that the national vote was now a highly urban vote. The majority of the Philippine population now resides in urban areas, which means that people are more likely to vote in a similar manner, when it comes to national issues, as Metro Manila. While the basis of political power in the provinces may still hark back to traditional rural relationships, this is less the case in urban areas. A situation where an administration clashes with local leadership might resonate strongly with similar urban areas: Malacañang versus Makati City or the Palace versus Naga City would reinforce not only each other, but the anti-administration sentiments of those casting their votes for senators. Media and the public also combined to resist fraud in the periphery: the Mindanao vote in particular unraveled in terms of certain areas (such as the ARMM) being easy targets for manipulation. Maguindanao was only the most stunning example of electoral shenanigans being exposed — and exposed to the extent that the province’s votes were taken out of play at a time when the administration needed to give the impression of a regional bandwagon for its slate. A combination of Namfrel, PPCRV, and Lente obstinacy prevented the Maguindanao and later, Lanao del Sur, elections from simply being tabulated; vigilance in other parts of Mindanao also led to such intense public and media pressure that the administration slate simply ran out of places to eke out a victory. There is also enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that in many places, schoolteachers simply refused to participate in fraud. The most interesting theory concerning this might account, for example, to the stronger-than-expected showing of Allan Peter Cayetano. There may have been a significant number of schoolteachers who found the Comelec’s conflicting orders concerning the crediting of his votes too offensive to implement. The depths of public antipathy toward the president were also demonstrated by the strong (and unexpectedly so, even to his supporters) showing of Trillanes, and the Pulse Asia Exit Poll’s findings of a 6-4-2 final result. With the recent capitulation of Team Unity’s Mike Defensor and Ralph Recto, the best the administration can hope to achieve is a 7-3-2 result, though the counting has remained remarkably consistent at 8-2-2.
IN THE end the House race, taken as a whole, did result in a big victory for the ruling coalition. But it was a mixed victory: 94 Lakas and 46 Kampi won overall; 26 seats went to the Nationalist People’s Coalition or NPC (generally in alliance with the administration). The party affiliations remain fluid, though: a Sun-Star report on May 30 placed the results at 92 for Lakas and 65 for Kampi! The opposition in its various manifestations thus garnered anywhere from 20 to 40 seats. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita claims the administration has 209 out of 230 seats. Whatever the eventual realignments within the ruling coalition, it did have a showing far better than those of administrations in 1987, or even 1992 and1998. But it’s debatable if the results represent a substantial improvement for the coalition compared to previous contests under the president’s watch in 2001 and 2004. Of the House district contests that had Lakas candidates locked in battle against rivals from Kampi, nine ended up with neither party winning. Lakas did clinch the lion’s share of the seats over which it fought against Kampi: 33 of 56 (59 percent). Kampi took 14 (25 percent). These figures, however, can only hint at the political momentum, and resources, squandered in such intramurals. They were so extreme as to suggest that they may eventually prove unprecedented. (See Table 3)
The senatorial results, whether pegged at 6-4-2, 7-3-2, or 8-2-2, are simply unprecedented for a sitting administration since the bicameral system was reestablished in 1987. They are on the scale of the two biggest repudiations endured by a sitting administration in senatorial elections: while not a total defeat on the scale of the Quirino Liberal Party (LP) slate in 1951, the 2007 results approximates the debacle experienced by Marcos’s midterm Nacionalista Party (NP) slate in 1971. In 1961 the NP, and in 1965 the LP, did as badly, but those were also years in which the NP and LP administrations, respectively, lost the presidency. It can even be argued that the two administration candidates who secured a comfortable victory — Joker Arroyo and Angara (who, while veteran legislators, have never been known as partisans of the administration) — won despite, and not because of, their Palace affiliation. Known partisans of the president did poorly, such as Defensor and Congressman Prospero Pichay, though not as miserably as the likes of Ilocos Sur Governor Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, whose pro-provinces platform failed to resonate. On the whole, after the extremes the country has oscillated between since 2000-2001, the country expressed itself firmly in favor of the familiar. The parameters couldn’t be clearer, and they firmly hem in Arroyo, who can labor to redeem herself by means of economic performance, but who would be playing with fire if she revives charter change. The country has already been planning for the post-Arroyo years, which actually begin in a year or at most two, when the 2010 presidential campaign starts in earnest. The 2007 elections did prove, however, that even in a midterm election in which the public isn’t deeply engaged, the country’s institutions were hard-pressed to conduct a credible election. The recent round of polls was barely credible. And there is little sign an administration that gave up all its previous chances to implement serious electoral reform will do so in its remaining years. Which means, if this election was chaotic, expensive, and costly in terms of lives and institutional reputations, 2010 promises to be a lot worse. Manuel L. Quezon III is a columnist and contributing editor of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and hosts a weekly show, “The Explainer,” on ANC.
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