Poll volunteers bringing ballot boxes to canvassing center in ARMM. [photo courtesy of Anfrel]

NOW YOU see why news about Comelec’s planned electronic voting experiment in Singapore is positive. Last April, the commission even caused ripples in the global geek ecology when it invited hackers all over the world to try breaking into the Internet voting system, which runs from July 10 to 30.

For the Comelec, it’s a big leap. Previously, its attempts to push the computerization agenda were done mostly in the political arena and resulted in dead-end debates. But now it has stopped talking and just went and did it. Okay: some legal challenges forced the commission to lower its expectations and make it a mock vote instead. But this latest move by the Comelec sends a good message. “Our system is secure,” they seem to be saying, “and you can try finding holes in it.” By doing this, Comelec provides us an opportunity to see the digital system in action and then see its weaknesses and strengths.

This early, some geeks have already raised some concerns about the Comelec implementation. One of the main criticisms against it is that it is built on a patented, proprietary system — specifically, one developed by the Spanish company Scytl Consortium. As any self-respecting geek would tell you, a patented software system is dangerous, since the system will likely be expensive and not entirely open to scrutiny. It also makes the user, i.e. our country, highly dependent on the firm that sold it.

Instead, government could have preferred to use Free and Open Source Software (FOSS). FOSS will cost a fraction of the price tag of a patented system. It will also allow many techies to join in the process, check the software for security holes, and patch it efficiently and at less cost to the government. In contrast, a patented software system will lock us with the foreign vendor. Making changes to the patented software is also likely to introduce higher maintenance costs. We will not be able to shift easily to other, cheaper service providers, since the source code is the foreign firm’s property.

Another criticism levelled against the mock Internet elections is that malicious hackers would most probably keep mum about security holes that they find during the event. They could then exploit the holes to their advantage at a later date, i.e. when real e-elections are held. Holding one mock vote should also not fool us into thinking that the system will forever be secure.

Let's be clear on one thing. In the real world — as it is in the electronic world — nothing is absolutely secure. Locks can be picked or disassembled. Boxes can be pried open. Documents and ballots can be altered. These risks have not stopped us from holding elections.

The same reasoning applies to the digital world: we can conduct electronic transactions with an acceptable degree of security and risk. In the same light, we can safely vote, count, and declare winners in electronic elections before malicious people can corrupt the system. Provided, of course, that we remain vigilant and have no brownouts.

Ruben Canlas Jr. is CEO and Chief Knowledge Consultant of Dig It All Solutions Inc., an IT consultancy and software development firm. He is also a consultant for various private and government agencies and nongovernmental organizations, an IT columnist for Entrepreneur, and a blogger for GMANews.tv.