by JULIO C. TEEHANKEE

	Members of the First Philippine Assembly of 1907

FOR SOME 160 families, the two Houses of the Philippine Congress have practically been home for the last century. These families have had two or more members who have served in Congress, and they account for nearly 424 of the 2,407 men and women who have been elected to the national legislature from 1907 to 2004.

Political clans have been an enduring feature of Philippine politics. In the upcoming local and congressional contests, that will remain to be so. Majority of these families or clans, in fact, take their roots from local politics. Generally considered as a grouping within the elites of society, the political clan is basically composed of a family and its network of relations that actively pursues elective or appointive political office at the local and/or national level. In many cases, the clan has also managed to maintain power through generations.

Continuing clan dominance is a product of the seemingly immutable and unequal socio-economic structure, as well as the failure to develop a truly democratic electoral and party system. The institutional, legal, electoral, and party systems have prevented the expansion of the base of aspirants and candidates for representation. The social and class structure in the Philippines shaped a landowning system, which in turn enabled a core of landed families to accumulate economic and political power through time.

At the same time, political clans have displayed an uncanny ability to adapt to the changing landscape of Philippine politics. Through the years, the nature and organization of politics, particularly at the local level, have gradually transformed in the face of urbanization, decentralization, and the growing influence of mass media. In response, political clans have mobilized an array of adaptive strategies that include: 1) the establishment and maintenance of a kinship network; 2) the organization of political machines; 3) the mobilization of wealth and property; 4) access to state resources; 5) the use of violence and coercion; and 6) the cultivation of issues, image, and popularity.

These strategies are interrelated and oftentimes overlap with one another. Kinship networks, for example, serve to consolidate wealth and power, and provide the base for the establishment of a political machine. Beyond the usage of personal wealth, access to state resources serves as an additional source of patronage dispensed through political machines. When the machine functions properly, there is no need to resort to coercion or violence. Articulating a hot-button issue, projecting the right image, or simply being a celebrity can bolster one's chances of victory in today's media-driven elections.

The French historian Roland Mousnier observed, "Rank attracts power and money. Power is the generator of prestige and fortune. Riches give power and rank." It is therefore no wonder that among the people attracted to politics are those whose ambitions are motivated largely by personal (or more specifically, clan) interests. And while the government provides various avenues for political leaders, in the Philippines it is Congress that has become a training ground and jump-off point for higher political office. Thus, aside from its formal legislative functions, the Philippine Congress has served as a nexus between national and local elite politics.

HISTORICALLY, PHILIPPINE society has been resilient to change. Between 1946 to 1972, the traditional landowning families that make up a national oligarchy exerted a high degree of influence over state policies and its implementation, directly through Congress and indirectly through local government administration. The national oligarchy was able to exercise powerful and particularistic control of the state apparatus (e.g. legislature) through the spoils system, while maintaining an independent economic base outside it.

	Members of the First Philippine Senate

The traditional elites have demonstrated their prowess in adapting to shifting political and economic regimes. For the longest time, the social and class structure of the Philippines sustained a landowning system that perpetually concentrated economic and political power to a core of landed families — especially those involved in export plantation agriculture. But some families later successfully diversified into non-agricultural economic interests, such as real estate, logging, mining, and other industrial enterprises. This was achieved through a variety of means that include the establishment of family-owned banks, the procurement of loans and subsidies from state banks and government financial institutions, and having tie-ups with foreign and local capitalists. These clans also used their legislative posts to defend and expand their economic interests. In addition, their access to state resources augmented the distribution of patronage to their kinship networks and political machines.

The ability to source and distribute patronage allowed the less politically agile among the traditional clans, like the Albanos of Isabela, to maintain their electoral machinery. The Albanos' economic base was limited to a few hectares of land and a handful of business enterprises; they could not get a foothold in the lucrative logging industry dominated by the rival Dy clan. The Albanos thus relied on their access to a succession of presidents (Marcos, Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo) for economic and political resources.

Some political clans, however, have also used violence to maintain their dominance. Political warlordism was a result of the proliferation of arms and the weakening of the central authority in the provinces at the end of the Second World War. It would later re-emerge in areas where instability was fueled by the land frontier, protracted ethnic rivalry, or particular economic circumstance.

The Lluch-Badelles clan of Lanao, for instance, rose to power amid the historical conflict brought about by frontier politics in Mindanao. The clan had to swim in the tide of violence brought about by post-war confrontations between Christian and Muslim armed groups that were fueled by cultural and economic animosities. But the clan's dominance of Lanao politics was eclipsed with the emergence of a more violent political warlord in the person of Mohamad Ali Dimaporo.

There is also Cebu's Durano clan, which has effectively combined the use of violence and rent-seeking activities. Ramon Durano Sr.'s dominance in Danao blurred the thin line between the private and public domain. His family's political exploits mirror the historical trajectory of Philippine state-formation: from the violence and clientelism of the post-war republic, to the dictatorship of the Marcos regime, and redemocratization in the post 1986 period. But decades of dominance have eliminated almost all possible political challenges to the clan. As a result, its members have turned against each other in an occasionally bloody intra-family conflict.