JUAN PONCE ENRILE Photo by Lilen Uy

HE BEGAN the military undertaking that developed into the first Philippine People Power, but Juan Ponce Enrile has vowed never again to unseat a sitting president with the help of the military. This was what he told opponents of President Joseph Estrada when they asked him to join Edsa Dos in 2001.

Enrile says he has long been disillusioned with what became of Edsa 1. "It has been converted into a cultist effort to mystify and sanctify certain persons," he says.

He avoids naming former President Corazon 'Cory' Aquno and declines to say whether or not he regrets turning over power to her in 1986. He does say, though, that if he were to do it all over again, there would be some "modifications." For starters, Enrile says, "I'd probably not make people (who are unprepared) handle power."

That would have saved his men, led by Lt. Col. Gregorio Honasan, the trouble of launching one coup attempt after another against the Aquino government. After the December 1989 coup try, Enrile himself was charged with rebellion complexed with murder and imprisoned without bail. But the Supreme Court threw the case out, saying no such charge or offense existed under Philippine laws.

Enrile was Aquino's first defense minister. He had occupied the same position in the Marcos government. But by the time he and members of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) holed up with several sympathizers first in Camp Aguinaldo, and then in Camp Crame, for four days in February 1986, he had already tendered his resignation from the Marcos cabinet.

That was probably because he was preparing for something bigger. According to Enrile, there was a point during Edsa 1 when he could have assumed power. One plan had him heading a revolutionary council upon Ferdinand Marcos's ouster. Among those being considered as council members were Cory Aquino, widow of slain opposition leader Benigno 'Ninoy' Aquino Jr.; Gen. Fidel Ramos, then the vice chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Ambassador to Thailand Rafael Ileto; Rafael Salas, head of the United Nations Population Fund; plus two military officials and three civilians.

Enrile says a despondent Marcos had surrendered the government to him on the morning of Feb. 25, 1986. But Enrile took into consideration the snap election held just a couple of weeks before, in which Marcos had done battle with Cory Aquino. Marcos was proclaimed winner by the Commission on Elections, but now here he was, fleeing.

"It would have been awkward, in my judgment, for the military to assert itself and assume power when there was a group, a democratic group that contested the right of Marcos to govern," says Enrile. "With that argument, the others agreed with me when I said, 'Let's attend the oath taking of Cory in Club Filipino.'"

	JUAN PONCE ENRILE Photo by Lilen Uy

ALTHOUGH IT was over in a matter of days, the first Edsa revolt actually took nearly four years in the making. Enrile and some of his staff and security officers hit the drawing boards in late 1982, even before they knew that Marcos had become very ill. They saw cracks in the Marcos government and since there was no constitutional provision for succession, they were worried that things would become messy once he was gone.

In most circles, it had been assumed that Enrile, one of Marcos's most trusted associates, was the strongman's heir apparent. But Enrile and his supporters had learned that Gen. Fabian Ver, then the armed forces chief, was planning to set up a post-Marcos military government.

"We were thinking of protecting ourselves because of the growing fissures in the Marcos government," says Enrile. At the same, he adds, they felt that it was time to really dismantle the martial-law machinery. Martial law had been "lifted" in 1981, but Marcos retained his authoritarian powers. Interestingly, when Marcos declared martial law in 1972, he had cited a supposed ambush on Enrile's car as proof that the move was necessary.

The Enrile blueprint for a post-Marcos scenario included a revolutionary transition government that would evolve into a democratic one. At least that's what he says. Enrile also says there were target dates for a mutiny, but unforeseen events caused several postponements. One was the 1983 assassination of Ninoy Aquino. Another came on Nov. 3, 1985, when Marcos suddenly announced on a U.S. TV news show that he would be calling for a snap election.

"Because of that election set for February," says Enrile, " I told my people, what's the point in this military effort against the government when there's going to be an election? If Marcos loses, that's the end. (We achieve) our purpose of returning the country into a condition of democratic freedom. If Marcos (wins), then we will rethink our position."

And so when Marcos was proclaimed winner of the Feb. 7, 1986 snap polls, Enrile and company brought out their plan. They decided to mount the mutiny on the dawn of Feb. 23, a Sunday. But of course they would never get a chance to carry that out.