Out of the Barracks

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(Since the Marcos era, the military has been a ubiquitous presence in successive Philippine governments. This has brought some benefits to these governments, but it has also caused them pain. The fall of Marcos, for example, was precipitated by a failed coup mounted by a disgruntled, although previously pampered, military faction. Corazon Aquino faced numerous challenges from military rebels while Joseph Estrada was finally brought down when the military top brass withdrew their support.

In We Were Soldiers: Military Men in Politics and the Bureaucracy, a pamphlet published recently by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, journalist Glenda Gloria documents the presence of soldiers in post-Edsa governments. Gloria, who has covered the military since the 1980s, notes the military’s changing roles, lists down officers who have held civilian posts, and explains the officer corps’ propensity for politics in terms of the socialization of its members in the armed forces and the nature of the political regimes that preside over them.

Her conclusion is that the military presence in the civilian bureaucracy and in electoral politics is here to stay as long as the armed forces brokers political transitions and fights insurgencies and civilian institutions remain weak.)

SINCE THE 1986 People Power revolt, four sectors in the government have been host to a significant number of military appointees. These are the Department of National Defense (DND), government-owned corporations and special economic zones, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and the Bureau of Customs.

The military has stopped staging coups like this one in 1989, but it remains a powerful political force. [Associated Press photo]

Of the 21 defense secretaries since 1941, more than half — 11 — had served in the Philippine military. Of the 11, six got their military training from United States, either at West Point, Fort Leavenworth, or as a member of the United States Armed Forces for the Far East (USAFFE). At least 26 military officers have been assigned to the DND since Marcos fell from power in 1986.

In addition, at least 26 retired and active-duty military officers have been assigned to the DOTC since 1986. The department is one of the government’s top revenue-generating sectors. Under the Arroyo and Ramos governments, military officers headed the Land Transportation Office, which is in charge of issuing driver’s licenses and car registrations and is the government’s fifth biggest revenue earner.

There are many military appointees in government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) as well as in special economic zones (free ports) that were established following the liberalization of the economy after the 1986 People Power revolution. Board memberships in GOCCs are considered patronage posts, given the huge allowances that board members receive (a high of P100, 000 a month in the case of the Social Security System, for example).

Under the Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo administrations, at least 37 military officers occupied posts in GOCCs and special economic zones.

The Bureau of Customs, too, which is the government’s biggest revenue generating agency, has had its shares of military appointees — nine under the Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo administrations.

Military officers explain that their expertise is maximized in departments dealing with security, foreign relations, communications, and mobility. However, the Bureau of Customs is tasked with collecting revenues; thus this argument is tenuous as far as this agency is concerned.

The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) was established under the Marcos regime precisely to develop a civilian intelligence agency that would serve the President, apart form the intelligence units of the Armed Forces. The rationale for a civilian intelligence agency is that it’s supposed to have a wider access to information because it is less intimidating than military units. However, since 1986 up to the present, retired military generals have led the NICA.

Of the post-Marcos governments, the Estrada and Aquino administrations, which had the least number of military appointees, suffered under the military. Aquino had to battle six coup attempts by rebel soldiers while Estrada was forced to step down when the military high command withdrew support from him.

Based on the records, the Ramos and Arroyo governments are “military friendly” regimes under which the soldier’s socialization could be marked as “civilianized.”

The continued appointment to the bureaucracy and election of active and retired military officers is best understood by understanding the soldier’s socialization and the nature of the regime at the time of their appointment.

We conclude that this pattern shall continue in the coming years.

It is difficult, almost impossible to unlearn what the soldier has learned and been exposed to in the last four decades. His socialization and the fact that the regime tolerates this, has laid out for the soldier the inevitable option of taking over civilian tasks once he’s done with his military service. In reality, his work as a soldier already serves as his training ground: helping communities in disaster operations, assisting medical missions, building roads and bridges in remote towns, analyzing the root causes of rebellion and insurgency, and realizing that the two prevail because of failure of civilian governance.

On the other hand, the last 16 years brought about “military-friendly” regimes that accepted, and in some cases encouraged, the influence and the participation of the military in running state affairs. In this instance, why bother staging a coup when power would be better wielded – and accepted – through government appointments and elective posts? Notice the huge number of military officers who joined elections since 1992, when Ramos was elected president. The last coup attempt by the rebel soldiers was staged in 1989; what followed was nothing beyond rumors and noise about an impending coup.

Military theorists argue that the blurring of line between civilian and military tasks results in the weakening of civilian institutions.

American academic Louis Goodman, Dean of the School of International Service of the American University, argues that the military should eventually give up these “transitional roles” – combating drug trafficking, fighting other crimes, constructing roads and bridges. To make this role “permanent” weakens the capability of political systems to fully develop and causes the armed forces to neglect their traditional role on defense and security. He cites one particular disadvantage in combating drug trafficking – a military officer would be vulnerable to bribery and this, in turn, would cause disrespect of the military.

I would argue a step further to stay that the appointment of officers in the civilian posts is reflective of the rent-seeking character of the country’s influential sectors, which include the officer corps of the Armed Forces. In various departments and agencies, we see not only “ military dynasties” but also blocks and turfs controlled by various elite groups such as fraternity organizations, a group of university alumni, or a law firm. Thus, it has become a norm to hear of a University of the Philippines “mafia” in a certain department or a Sigma Rho (a fraternity of law students in UP) gang in the Department of Justice.

What distinguishes the military “mafia” is the soldier’s culture, the top-down organization that he’s familiar with, the wide network he enjoys, and most significantly, his access to, and training in, arms.

It is the latter that puts regimes in a most vulnerable situation. As discussed earlier, the military’s access to arms has affected the way administrations have treated it vis-à-vis appointment to government posts.

For so long as the military brokers political transitions, for so long as there are insurgencies and rebellions that make the nation dependent on its armed forces, and for so long as weak civilian institutions remain vulnerable to destabilizing forces, this pattern of military appointments to the bureaucracy shall continue. Regimes will choose this path rather than risk an armed confrontation with their politicized soldiers.